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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
such finding and its basis in the rules issued) that such pro-
cedures were impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest.3 7 This federal provision obviously contains at
least the minimum requirement that a federal agency must make
a considered decision as to whether public or ad hoc rule-making
shall be utilized and must publicly justify that decision. The
Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides that "prior
to the adoption of any rule authorized by law, or the amendment
or repeal thereof, the adopting agency shall as far as practicable,
publish or otherwise circulate notice of its intended .action and
afford interested persons opportunity to submit data or views
orally or in writing. 's 8
Having decided that the agency had the power to change its
rules ad hoc, the court further found there was nothing in the
record "to indicate that they did not act in accordance with
what they thought was the best interest of the public in granting
one application and denying another," noting that "where a dis-
cretion is vested in an adminstrative board, courts cannot sub-
stitute their judgment for that of an administrative body." One
member of the court, in dissent, found nothing in the statute
granting rule-making power in connection with licensing; even
if granted, he would have found the statute unconstitutional as
containing no standards for guiding the agency in making rules
pursuant to granting and denying licenses. The majority found
such rule-making power and also found the limiting standard
of the "public interest" was impliedly contained in the act. The
dissenting member of the court would also have found a gross
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission both with
respect to its interpretation of the statute and its findings of
fact thereunder.
Local Government
Alvin B. Rubin*
IMPLIED LIMITATIONS ON MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY
Even a municipal ordinance clearly within the power con-
ferred upon the municipality by its charter may be invalid if
the ordinance is contrary to a state statutory provision or if the
37. 5 U.S.C. §1003 (1952).
38. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CO.rMISSIONE8 ON .UWIi-
F9RM STATE LAWS 329, 330. § 2(3) (1944).
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Legislature has adopted a comprehensive statutory plan govern-
ing the same matter.' This well-established rule has created re-
peated problems in various states, for, while the rule is clear, its
scope leaves a wide range for judicial discretion in applying the
rule. Two cases decided in the last term illustrate some of the
problems which arise.
The act creating the Office of State Fire Marshal prohibits
the storing of trash or other combustible material within thirty
feet of a building for a period longer than twelve hours or over-
night.2 Shreveport adopted a municipal ordinance creating the
office of Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau. The ordinance
prohibited the storing of combustible material in any building or
upon any premises within any residential area without a permit
from the Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau. It provided that
"it shall be a violation of this ordinance, after proper and legal
notice has been given,... to permit any such materials to remain
for more than twenty-four (24) hours on any premises or in
any building located within any residential area." A person
found guilty of violation of the ordinance contended that the or-
dinance "transcends the power of the city" because the ordi-
nance penalized conduct which was not an offense under the
state statute. Under the state statute, the argument ran, a busi-
ness located in a residential area is exempt from prosecution.
The court held that the state law "is not a comprehensive
fire code but purports to regulate the larger public buildings...
and it does not prevent municipalities from establishing compre-
hensive fire regulations." Municipalities may enact laws to sup-
plement the state statute provided they do not conflict with the
provisions of the state law upon the same subject and provided
the municipality was given subordinate authority by city charter
to legislate.8
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar; Part-time Professor of Law, Louisiana State
University.
1. See, e.g., Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942) ; Nayle v.
City of Grand Island, 144 Neb. 67, 12 N.W.2d 540 (1943) ; State ex tel. Arey v.
Sherill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E. 501 (1944) ; Reutener v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio
St. 117, 141 N.H. 27 (1923).
2. LA. R.S. 40:1605 (1950).
3. Shreveport v. Provenza, 231 La. 514, 518, 91 So.2d 777, 778 (1956). Or-
dinances adopted in the exercise of police power to meet particular local needs,
and in the furtherance of state policy as expressed through existing statutes, will
be sustained in the absence of direct conflict. See Baton Rouge v. Rebowe, 226 La.
186, 75 So.2d 239 (1954) ; City of Minden v. Warren, 199 La. 494, 6 So.2d 558
(1942) ; State ex tel. Sutton v. Caldwell, 195 La. 507, 197 So. 214 (1940).
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Under the rule laid down in the court's prior decisions, 4 there
could be little doubt that the state statute failed to preempt the
field. But the application of the rule is not always so clear.5
A similar question was raised in City of Lafayette v. Elias.6
State law prohibits the sale of beverages with alcoholic content
to "any person under the age of 18." 7 The City of Lafayette
adopted an ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages
"to any person below the age of 21 years." The court repeated
the views expressed in an earlier case that "a municipality with
subordinate authority to legislate . . .may make such new and
additional regulations in furtherance of the purpose of state
law as may seem fit and appropriate to the necessities of the lo-
cality and be not in themselves unreasonable."" The ordinance
was found to be "appropriate to the necessities of the locality and
not in itself unreasonable." Justice Simon dissented on the basis
that "the municipality has declared unlawful that which the
State and this Court have declared to be lawful."
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCES
In Doll v. The Flintkote Co.9 the plaintiff sought to set aside
an exchange of property between the City of New Orleans and
a private corporation, on the ground that the City Council had
not properly authorized the exchange of the property owned by
the city, formerly the right of way of a street. The Charter of
the City of New Orleans permits the Commission "by a two-
thirds vote to sell or change the destination of any street."'10 The
4. Baton Rouge v. Rebowe, 226 La. 186, 75 So.2d 239 (1954) ; State em rel.
Sutton v. Caldwell, 195 La. 507, 197 So. 214 (1940).
5. In a discussion of "Limitation of Municipal Action by State Law" before
the Louisiana City Attorneys Association several years ago, Mr. R. Gordon Kean,
Jr., attorney for the City of Baton Rouge and the Parish of East Baton Rouge,
reviewed numerous cases involving the problem. He concluded that: (1) The
municipal ordinance cannot prohibit what the state law permits, particularly in
fields of general state policy. See Loewenberg v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co., 147
So. 81 (La. App. 1933) (wherein a Shreveport ordinance establishing a driving
age greater than that fixed by state law was held invalid) ; City of Minden v.
David Bros. Drug Co., 195 La. 791, 197 So. 505 (1940) (where a municipal or-
dinance requiring a registration of physicians in a dry ward was held invalid as
contrary to the "policy of exempting such persons as set forth in the local option
law"). (2) A state statute occupying the whole legislative field will control.
See New Orleans v. Ernst, 155 La. 426, 99 So. 391 (1923) (where ordinance held
invalid because same subject regulated by the State Board of Health under the
State Sanitary Code; the court found the statutes conferred full supervision of
the entire subject matter upon the state).
6. LA. R.S. 26:285 (1950).
7. 232 La. 700, 95 So.2d 281 (1957).
8. State ez rel. Sutton v. Caldwell, 195 La. 507, 518, 197 So. 214, 218 (1940).
9. 231 La. 241, 91 So.2d 24 (1956).
10. La. Acts 1912, No. 159, § 8, p. 265, as amended by La. Acts 1948, No. 378,
§ 8, p. 1018.
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plaintiff contended that the statute required a favorable vote by
two-thirds of all of the elected members of the Commission Coun-
cil, hence a vote by six of the eight elected persons. The court
held, however, that the statute required only a two-thirds vote
of a quorum, and hence the favorable vote of five members at a
meeting attended by only five members of the council was suf-
ficient. This is in accordance with the prior jurisprudence"1
which has construed similar statutory requirements to relate to
a quorum and not to the entire elected membership of a public
body unless the latter meaning was clearly intended by the
statute.
In City of Pineville v. Tarver 2 the court held that a munici-
pality exceeded its authority in adopting an ordinance making it
"unlawful for any person .. .to . . . use .. .or consume ...
intoxicating liquors... within said town." The local option law 8
permits the prohibition of the business of dealing in alcoholic
beverages and the ordinance was therefore "clearly ultra vires."
CIVIL SERVICE APPEALS
The court affirmed a ruling of the New Orleans Civil Service
Commission, sustaining the action of the superintendent of police
in fining a detective and demoting him to the rank of patrolman
on the ground that he had been involved in a fight while intoxi-
cated.14 The court found that there was "some evidence" to sup-
port the decision, and restated the rule previously well estab-
lished that, in such cases, it will not examine the weight to be
accorded evidence or the sufficiency of the evidence, its appellate
jurisdiction in such matters being limited to "questions of law
alone."15 In another case the court reversed a trial court de-
cision which had ordered a dismissed employee of the Baton
Rouge Police Department reinstated with only a suspension from
duty, where the employee had been charged with engaging in
local political activities in violation of the Municipal Fire and
Police Civil Service Law.' 6 Where there is cause for disciplinary
11. State em rel. Garland v. Guillory, 184 La. 329, 166 So. 94 (1935) ; Warnoch
v. City of Lafayette, 4 La. Ann. 419 (1849). But compare Miller v. Rapides
Parish School Board, 209 La. 877, 25 So.2d 623 (1946).
12. 231 La. 446, 91 So.2d 597 (1956).
13. La. Acts 1935 (1 E.S.), No. 17, p. 494. The ordinance was adopted under
the provisions of that act, which have been superseded by La. Acts 1948, No. 372,
p. 996, incorporated as LA. R.S. 26:581 (1950).
14. Jordan v. New Orleans Police Department, 232 La. 926, 95 So.2d 607
(1957).
15. See id. at 930, 95 So.2d at 608, and authorities cited therein.
16. Marchiafava v. Baton Rouge Fire & Police Civil Service Board, 96 So.2d
1957]
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action, and the Board acts "in good faith," the question of
whether the penalty imposed is excessive is not one for judicial
review.17 In both cases the court followed what appears to be
the policy of constitutional and statutory provisions guarantee-
ing to civil service employees on whom disciplinary action has
been taken a fair hearing, but leaving the merits of the contro-
versy to the Civil Service Board. The wisdom of this policy ap-
pears indisputable; any other would plunge the courts in every
case into detailed consideration of the adequacy or inadequacy
of the evidence and the appropriateness or excessiveness of the
penalty imposed.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Melvin G. Dakin*
In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Lou-
isiana Public Service Commission' the court upheld a rate order
which represented for this Commission a first full application 2
of the principles of rate making expounded by Justice Brandeis
in his concurring opinion in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company3 and subsequently approved in application
by the United States Supreme Court in Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Hope Natural Gas Company.4 Excerpts from the Missouri
concurring opinion state these principles succinctly:
"I differ fundamentally from my brethren concerning the
rule to be applied in determining whether a prescribed rate
is confiscatory .... The so-called rule of Smyth vs. Ames is,
in my opinion, legally and economically unsound. The thing
devoted by the investor to the public use is not specific prop-
erty, tangible and intangible, but capital embarked in the
enterprise.... The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a
26 (La. 1957). The Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Law was created by
LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15.1.
17. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 31: "This hearing shall be confined to the determi-
nation of whether the decision made by the board was in good faith for cause
under the provisions of this Section."
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 232 La. 446, 94 So.2d 431 (1957).
2. For an earlier abortive attempt to apply these principles, see Gulf States
Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 222 La. 132, 62 So.2d 250
(1952) commented on in 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 104 (1953).
3. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission of Missouri, 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
4. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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